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Home > School of Law > Student > Law Review > Vol. > Iss. 1 (2026)

 

Western New England Law Review

Abstract

Our current Social Security structure provides disability benefits through two programs: Title II Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (SSI). This Note will argue that the current structure of the SSI program actually disincentivizes disabled folk whom are able to work from returning to or entering the work force. A number of factors adversely affect an SSI recipient: (i) the strict definition of “disabled” to mean an inability to engage in a “substantial gainful activity level”; (ii) a cap on the total assets one can hold earn before losing benefits; (iii) poorly framed work incentive programs; (iv) the fear of losing healthcare benefits such as Medicaid and other state benefits that are closely tied to SSI enrollment; and (v) the slow, unresponsive, and bureaucratic process of dealing with the SSA. Thus, many participants are faced with a losing dilemma, either (1) stay on SSI to receive an unlivable stipend and maintain many crucial benefits; or (2) enter the workforce and lose their necessary healthcare benefits attached to SSI. Aside from delving into the history, purpose, and short falls of SSI, this Note offers a myriad of beneficial reformations. Most notably, this Note suggests that (i) the asset limit for SSI should be raised; (ii) the work incentive programs need to provide resources rather than exclude earned income; and (iii) that Medicaid benefits should be tied to physical or mental impairments, as opposed to the ability to gain income. As a basis for these changes, this Note suggests the U.S. should replicate the United Kingdom’s 2010 social welfare reformations.

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